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Abstract 
 
In literature and surveys, the issue of economic impacts and consequences of 
potential immigration from non-EU countries like Albania to the EU labor market have 
been much debated especially in the EU side. According to the theories of migration, a 
major incentive to migrate is a real income or wage differentials between regions or 
countries. Also, the economic impact of immigration on wages and employment levels 
will obviously differ with the skill levels of migrants. If migrants mainly are unskilled 
and native workers skilled, like in the case of emigration from Albania to the EU 
especially to the neighbors and main receiving countries of Greece and Italy, we can 
easily say that Albanian and the EU workers are complements because of Albanian 
immigrants and the EU native workers are not substitutes in production. So, an 
increase in the number of Albanian immigrants raises the marginal product of the EU 
natives, shifting up the demand curve for the EU native-born workers. This increase in 
the EU native productivity raises the EU native wages. Moreover, some EU natives 
now see the higher wage rate as an additional incentive to enter the labor market, 
and the EU native employment also rises. On the other side, the empirical literature 
on this issue does not agree on the size of the potential immigrants from Albania to 
the EU labor market. Although, it is not clear what the sources were or the methods 
used to arrive at these estimates, there is reason to believe that the figures for the 
main countries such as Greece and Italy are very probable. According to the historical 
background size of the Albanian migrants to the especially Greece and Italy the size of 
migration after accession is estimated between 600 thousands and 1.1 million.  
 
Key words: immigration, Albania, the European Union, labor market, wages and 
employment 
 
1. Introduction 
The subject of potential migration flows from Albania and its effects on the EU labor 
market after free movement of labor is a considerable issue in Albania-EU future full 
membership process. In 1997 Albania was included in EU’s ‘Regional Approach’ 
programme, predecessor to today’s ‘Stabilisation and Association Process’ (SAP) 
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(European Council, 1997; 1999). Under the terms of the SAP, the EU offers Albania the 
possibility of future EU membership (European Council, 2000: Art. 69). 
On 12 June 2006, Albania signed in Luxembourg the Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement (SAA) and the Interim Agreement with the EU. As of December 2006, the 
Interim Agreement for trade and related isses has come into force. According to the 
European Commission, the implementation of the Interim Agreement has been 
successful. The Government of Albania has prepared and is implementing the National 
Plan for the Implementation of the Stabilization and Association Agreement as the 
main monitoring instrument of the political, economic, legal and institutional reforms 
and is consederd an integral part of the National Strategy for Development and 
Integration.  
The SAA is the instrument which will enable gradual integration of Albania into the 
European Union. The Agreement creates the necessary framework for strengthening 
the rule of law, increase its effectiveness, and assist institutional and economic 
reforms with the aim to raise the standards of living for all citizens. Through this 
Agreement, Albania aims to attain the standarts that will guarantee its status as a 
candidate state and subsequently association with the European Union.  
The SAA envisages the principle of national treatment, according to which an Albanian 
worker, legally employed in the territory of an EU member state, must be treated 
equally to the citizens of this EU member state with respect to working conditions, 
remuneration or dismissal. Further, the spouse and children of a legally employed 
worker in the territory of an EU member state, when they reside legally in this state, 
have the right to education and labor market acess in this member state during the 
period of that worker’s authorised stay of employment. However, access to 
employment for Albanian workers in the European market is limited because they 
remain at the willingness of the EU member states, which recognise free movement of 
worker through bilateral agreements, which they sign with Albania (IMF, 2008). 
The issue of the impact of emigration from Albania to the EU after free movement of 
labor on the EU countries’ labor markets is now being heatedly debated in Albania-EU 
membership process. In fact, the entrance into the EU means the removal of all 
barriers to free movement of labor.  According to the European opinion pools, the 
European labor market may be flooded with millions of unskilled non-EU workers. If 
substantial and uncontrolled, these immigration flows could lead to important 
disturbances in the EU labor market. The direction of migration flows will also be 
impacted on by the location of existing Albanian migrants especially in Greece and 
Italy. 
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Each of the EU annual reports goes deep into the technical details of inadequate 
legislation and procedures not yet conforming to EU norms. What is however lacking 
is empirical data on the evolution of migratory movements. One feature common to 
all reports is a blatant EU-centrism, completely neglecting the side-effects of 
migratory movements on the EU’s partner country Albania. ‘Progress’ is defined more 
or less in terms of the permeability of Albania’s borders and corresponding EU-style 
legislation, essentially disregarding the context of its implementation. Often there is a 
resort to vague statements leading to similarly vague suggestions: “Albania appears to 
have made progress regarding the control of illegal migration/trafficking towards the 
EU […], but events […] in early January demonstrate that further efforts are needed 
[…] However, border management continues to require substantial improvement” 
(European Commission, 2005: 35). 
 In this paper, we try to answer some current questions on this immigration 
impacts in the light of theory and empirical literature as follows: Will accession to the 
EU generate uncontrolled massive migration flows of Albanian migrants to the EU 
countries? How the wages and employment opportunities of the EU native workers 
will respond to migration from Albania to the EU labor market?  Are high wage level 
and skilled the EU workforce and Albania’s low skilled unemployed workforce perfect 
substitutions or complements? And, who will benefit and who will lose from 
immigration or will both sides win? This paper summarizes what we know about the 
impact of potential emigration flows from Albania on the EU labor market after free 
movement of labor and it also presents a survey of theoretical and empirical literature 
on this issue.  
2. Reasons to Migrate and the Labor Market Impact of Immigration: Theoretical 
Approach 
2.1. Decision to Migrate 
(a) The neoclassical approach 
The neoclassical approach to migration analysis can be traced back to Smith (Smith, 
1776) and Ravenstein (Ravenstein, 1889:214-301). The basic assumption of this model 
is that individuals maximize their utility subject to a budget constraint. The central 
argument evolves around wages. Hicks proposed that “differences in net economic 
advantages, chiefly differences in wages, are the main causes of migration” (Hicks, 
1932:76). Migration mainly occurs because of geographical differences in the demand 
and supply of labor markets. Regions with a shortage of labor relative to capital are 
characterized by a high equilibrium wage, whereas regions with a large supply of labor 
relative to capital are faced with low equilibrium wages. This wage differential causes 
a migration flow from low wage to high wage regions. 
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In response to this migration flow, the supply of labor in the high wage region 
increases; subsequently, the wage in this region falls. Similarly, due to migration, the 
supply of labor in the low wage region decreases and the wages in this region rise. The 
migration flow ends as soon as the wage differential between the two regions reflects 
the costs of movement from the low wage to the high wage region. As a result, the 
model argues, labor migration emerges from actual wage differentials between 
regions, i.e. the larger the wage differential the larger the migration flow (Bauer and 
Zimmermann, 1999:13). 
(b) Geographic migration as a human capital investment 
 
Sjaastad introduced the human capital model to migration research (Sjaastad, 
1962:80-93). This model, which probably became the most influential and widely used 
approach, treats migration as an investment decision of an individual. Practically all 
modern analysis of migration decisions uses this hypothesis as the point of departure 
and views the migration of workers as a form of human capital investment (Borjas, 
2008:322). Workers calculate the value of the employment opportunities available in 
each of the alternative labor markets, net out the costs of making the potential move, 
and choose whichever option maximizes the net present value of lifetime earnings.  
 Depending on their skill levels, individuals calculate the present discounted 
value of expected returns of their human capital in every region, including the home 
location. Migration occurs, if the returns, net of the discounted costs of movement, 
are larger in a potential destination region than the returns in the country of origin. 
The costs of movement not only include money costs like travel expenses, differences 
in the costs of living, and foregone earnings while moving, but also psychological costs 
arising, for example, from the separation from family and friends. It should be noted 
that every individual evaluates the returns and costs in a different way, depending on 
personal characteristics such as age, gender, and schooling (Bauer and Zimmermann, 
1999:15). 
We can calculate net present value of migration using this equation (McConnell et al., 
2003:279; Ehrenberg and Smith, 2009:325; Borjas, 2008:322): 
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In equation, if Vp is greater than zero, implying that the expected earnings gain 
exceeds the combined monetary and net psychic investment costs, the person will 
migrate. If, conversely, Vp is smaller than zero, the person will remain in his or her 
present job and location. All else being equal, the greater the annual earnings 
differential (E2 – E1) between the two jobs, the higher will be the present value of the 
net benefits (Vp), and the more likely it will be that an individual will migrate. 
 
(c) Family migration 
In the theories discussed above, migration theory focuses on treating migration as a 
problem of individual decision-making. A different approach challenges many of the 
foregone conclusions by postulating that families or households typically make 
migration decisions. Mincer examines the influence of an increased labor force 
participation of wives on the migration decision of families (Mincer, 1978:749-773). 
Household size and the number of working family members increase the sources of 
costs and benefits from migration. Those family members who do not move on their 
own initiative often have to face reduced earnings and employment possibilities in the 
labor market of the destination country. Therefore, a family will only migrate, if the 
gains of one family member internalize the losses of the other family members. 
Mincer, shows that increases in the labor force participation rates of women lead to 
increased interdependence of the partner's migration decision, which results in both 
less migration and more marital instability. Increased marital instability, in turn, 
encourages migration as well as an increase in women's labor force participation. 
Furthermore, migration should decrease with increasing family size (Bauer and 
Zimmermann, 1999:17-18; Borjas, 2008:329; Ehrenberg and Smith, 2009:332). 
 
2.2. The labor market impact of immigration  
(a) A simple model of the labor market impact of immigration  
The simplest model of immigration assumes that immigrants and natives are perfect 
substitutes in production. In other words, immigrants and natives have the same types 
of skills and are competing for the same types of jobs (Ehrenberg and Smith, 
2009:340-342; Borjas, 2008:181-184; McConnell et al., 2003:287-293; Borjas,1995:3-
22; Borjas,1994:1667-1717).  
 The impact of immigration on this labor market in the short run (with capital 
held fixed) is illustrated in Figure 1. As immigrants enter the labor market, the supply 
curve shifts out, increasing total employment from N0 to E1 and reducing wages from 
W0 to W1. Note that fewer native-born workers are willing to work at this lower wage, 
so the employment of native workers actually falls, from N0 to N1. In a sense, 
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immigrants “take jobs away” from natives by reducing the native wage and convincing 
some native workers that it is no longer worthwhile to work. 
 
 
Figure 1: The Short-Run Impact of Immigration When 
Immigrants and  
Natives Are Perfect Subsitutes 
 
The short run impact of immigration when native workers and immigrants are perfect 
substitutes, therefore, is unambiguous. As long as the demand curve is downward 
sloping and capital is fixed, an increase in immigration will move the economy down 
the demand curve, reducing the wage and employment of native-born workers. 
 Of course, the assumption that native workers and immigrants are perfect 
substitutes is questionable. It may be that immigrant and native workers are not 
competing for the same type of jobs. For instance, immigrants may be particularly 
adept at some types of labor-intensive agricultural production. This frees up the more 
skilled native workforce to perform tasks that make better use of their human capital. 
The presence of immigrants increases native productivity because natives can now 
specialize in tasks that are better suited to their skills. Immigrants and natives thus 
complement each other in the labor market.  
 If two groups are complement in production, an increase in the number of 
immigrants raises the marginal product of natives, shifting up the demand curve for 
native-born workers. As Figure 2 shows, this increase in native productivity raises the 
native wage from W0 to W1. Moreover, some natives who previously did not find it 
profitable to work now see the higher wage rate as an additional incentive to enter 
the labor market, and native employment also rises from N0 to N1.   
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Figure 2: The Short-Run Impact of Immigration When 
Immigrants and  
Natives Are Complements 
 
In the short run, say that immigrants and natives are perfect subsititution, the supply 
curve shifts to the right and the wage falls to W1. Immigration initally shifts out the 
supply curve. As a result, the wage falls and over time, capital expands as firms take 
advantage of the cheaper workforce, shifting out the labor demand curve.  
In the long run, the demand curve also shifts to the right and it must shift by a 
sufficient amonut to bring the labor market back to its pre-immigration equilibrium. In 
the end, the wage is again equal to W0. Note that, at this wage, the same number of 
native workers is employed as was employed prior to the immigrant influx. The long-
run effects of immigration when immigrants and natives are perfect substitutes are 
illustrated in Figure 3. 
 
    
 
Figure 3: The Long-Run Impact of Immigration When Immigrants and Natives Are 
Perfect Substitutes 
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(b)The economic benefits from immigration 
Immigrants may have an adverse impact on the job opportunities of the native 
workers whose skills resemble those of the immigrants. Immigrants can also make an 
important contribution to the receving country. To assess the net economic impact of 
immigration, it must be calculated the magnitute of these contributions (Ehrenberg 
and Smith,2009:340-342; Borjas, 2008:193-195; McConnell et al., 2003:287-293; 
Borjas, 1995:3-22; Borjas, 1994:1667-1717).  
 Consider the short-run suply-demand analysis presented in Figure 4. The 
supply curve of labor is given by S and the demand curve for labor is given by D. For 
simplicity, we assume that the labor supply curve is inelastic, so that there are N 
native-born workers. Competitive market equilibrium implies that the N native 
workers are employed at a wage of W0.  
 The labor demand curve is given by the value of marginal product schedule, so 
that each point on the demand curve tells us the contribution of the last worker hired. 
As a result, the area under the demand curve gives the total product of all workers 
hired. Hence, the area in trapezoid ABNO easures the value of national income prior 
to immigration. 
 What happens to national income when immigrants enter the country? If we 
assume that immigrants and natives are perfect substitutes in production, the supply 
curve shifts to S’ and the market wage falls to W1. National income is now given by the 
area in the trapezoid ACM0. The figure shows that the total wage bill paid to 
immigrants is given by the area in the rectangle FCMN, so that the increase in national 
income accruing to natives is given by the area in the triangle BCF. This triangle is the 
immigration surplus and measures the increase in national income that occurs as a 
result of immigration and that accrues to natives. 
Why does an immigration surplus arise? Because the market wage equals the 
productivity of the last immigrant hired. As a result, immigrants increase national 
income by more than what it costs to employ them.  
 The analysis in Figure 4 implies that if the demand curve is perfectly elastic (so 
that immigrants had no impact on the native wage rate), immigrants would be paid 
their entire value of marginal product and natives would gain nothing from 
immigration. Therefore, the immigration surplus exists only if native wage rates fall 
when immigrants enter the country. Therefore, immigration redistributes income 
from labor to capital. In terms of Figure 3, native workers lose the area in the 
rectangle W0BFW1, and this quantity plus the immigration surplus accrue to 
employers. Although native workers get a lower wage, these losses are more than 
offset by the increase in income accruing to native-owned firms. 
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Figure4: The Immigration Surplus 
 
How to calculate immigration surplus? Recall that the formula for the area of the 
riangle is one-half  times the base times the height. Figure 4 then implies that the 
value of the immigration surplus is given by  
  
Immigration surplus= ½ X (W0 – W1) X (M – N)  
 
This formula can be rewritten so as to obtain the immigration surplus as a fraction of 
national income. After rearranging the term in the equation, we get 
    
Immigration surplus
Where labor’s share of national income is the fraction of national income that accrues 
to workers
 = ½  X (% change in native wage rate) 
National Income           X (% change in employment) 
         X (%  labor’s share of national income) 
 
 
1
                                               
1 For example,  immigrants have increased labor supply by about 10 percent in the United 
States. A 10 percent immigrant-induced increase in supply lowers the wage by about 3 to 4 
percent. Finally, it is well known that labor’s share of national income is on the order of 0.7. 
This implies that immigration increases the real income of natives by only about 0.13 percent 
(or 0.5X0.035X0.10X0.7) The gross domestic product (GDP) of the United States is around $12 
trillion, so the economic gains from immigration are about $15 billion per year (Borjas, 1995, 3-
22). 
. 
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This estimate of the immigration surplus is a short-run estimate. In the long run, 
neither the rate of return to capital nor the wage is affected by immigration. As a 
result, the long-run immigration surplus must be equal to zero. Immigrants increase 
GDP in the long run, but the entire increase in national income is paid to immigrants 
for their services. Ironically, in a constant-returns-to-scale economy, the economic 
benefits  from immigraiton can only arise when workers in the receiving country are 
hurt by immigration. Equally important, the larger the adverse wage effects, the 
greater the economic benefits (Borjas,2008:195-196). 
 
3. Emigration from Albania to the EU: A Survey of Theoretical and Empirical 
Literature 
(a)A brief historical background of Albanian migration 
As widely documented in previous studies (Carletto et al. 2004; INSTAT 2004; King et 
al. 2005; King and Vullnetari 2003), Albania is a country on the move, with massive 
levels of both internal and international migration (Azzari and Carletto 2009: 2-3). 
When the communist government eventually fell, the end of the controls on internal 
and external migration and the collapse of the centrally planned economy unleashed a 
demographic shift at an unprecedented pace, as individuals and entire households 
started migrating to the cities or leaving the country altogether. By many accounts, 
within a decade the number of Albanians abroad swelled to at least 600,000 
individuals (King and Vullnetari 2003) or as high as 800,000 (Barjaba 2000). More 
recent estimates increase the figure to over 1 million (Government of Albania 2005). 
After the collapsing of communist system, migration flows can be broken down into 
the 1991-1992 stream, which was wholly uncontrolled, when approximately 300,000 
Albanians left the country; the 1992-1996 stream, when a similar number migrated, 
most illegally, despite the temporary improvement of the economy and better border 
controls; and the 1996-1997 stream, immediately after the collapse of various 
pyramid schemes, which wiped out the savings of hundreds of thousands of people. In 
the national unrest that followed, a combination of unemployment, poverty, and 
economic hardships led to the migration of around 70,000 people within a few 
months. Finally, since 1998, a gradual improvement in economic, political, and social 
conditions and favorable immigration policies in two key receiving countries, Greece 
and Italy, have increased legal migration and reduced illegal flows (Barjaba, 2004; 
Vullnetari, 2007). 
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 (b)The size and structure of current immigration flows from Albania to the EU: 
Related data 
Albanian contemporary migration is taking place under very different circumstances 
than the other sending countries of migration. In particular, its massive concentration 
over a short period of time as the country moved almost overnight from total closure 
to large-scale out-migration, marks Albanian migration as a significant and unique 
case. Albanian migration movement described as ‘a new migration order’ and a 
‘laboratory for the study of migration and development’. Taking into account these 
circumstances and special features, post-1990 Albanian emigration is a ‘new’ type of 
international migration.  
Based on research and studies carried out throughout the first post 
communist decade, Barjaba first suggested an ‘Albanian model’ of emigration in 2000. 
This model has the following features: it is intense (a rate of emigration much higher 
than any other Eastern bloc country); it is largely economically driven – a form of 
‘survival migration’; it has a high degree of irregularity, with many undocumented 
migrants; it displays lots of to-and-fro movement, especially with Greece; and it is 
dynamic and rapidly evolving, especially as regards new destinations and routes of 
migration (Vullnetari 2007: 40).  
 By the present day, approximately 25 percent of the total population, or over 
35 percent of the labor force, has emigrated. The country has approximately 900,000 
emigrants, now residing mainly in Greece (600,000), Italy (200,000), and most of the 
remainder in other Western European countries, the US, and Canada. Albania's 
migration flow has, since the early 1990s, been five times higher than the average 
migration flow in developing countries.  
In 2000 the Albanian Department of Emigration within the Albanian Ministry of Labour 
and Social Affairs estimated that, by 1999, there were 800,000 Albanians living abroad 
(Barjaba 2000). The majority of them, 500,000, were in Greece, 200,000 were in Italy, 
and the remaining 100,000 in other European countries and in North America. These 
figures combined documented and an estimate of undocumented migrants: in Italy 
documented migrants were in the majority; in Greece, until recently, most Albanians 
were undocumented. Some of the figures presented were likely to be underestimates, 
given the mobility of Albanian migrants, especially within Europe, and the rapid 
evolution of new migration channels and routes in recent years. Although it is not 
clear how these estimates were calculated, they are the most cited that apply to this 
period (1990-99), and they have remained largely unchallenged. 
 A second and – in a sense – more reliable source of data on emigration was 
provided by the results of the 2001 Albanian Census (INSTAT 2002). The Census 
revealed an estimated net loss due to emigration of more than 600,000 between 
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1989-2001, calculated by the census residual method (calculating net emigration as 
the residual of inter-censal population change, minus the net difference between 
births and deaths). This figure, however, excluded short-term migration of less than 
one year’s duration, and thus, much emigration to Greece, which is temporary.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
More recently, the Government of Albania has published revised estimates, which put 
the number of Albanians abroad at over one million by 2005 (Government of Albania 
2005: 36). Although, it is not clear what the sources were or the methods used to 
arrive at these estimates, there is reason to believe that the figures for the main 
countries such as Greece and Italy are very probable.  
 
 
Country                                                                                           1999                    2005 
Greece  500,000  600,000  
Italy  200,000  250,000  
USA  12,000  150,000  
UK  5,000  50,000  
Germany  12,000  15,000  
Canada  5,000  11,500  
Belgium  2,500  5,000  
Turkey  1,000  5,000  
France  2,000  2,000  
Austria  2,000  2,000  
Switzerland  1,000  1,500  
Netherlands  ?  1,000  
TOTAL  742,500  1,093,000  
 non-migrants  migrants   
Individual characteristics % of 
females  
age  
years of schooling  
 
Education levels 
adult years of education max 
  
 
0.69  0.35  
36.6  31.5  
9.8  10.1  
  
 
9.23  
 
8.36  
                                                                                                    ICES’09 
 
443 
 
Second International Conference on European Studies
Table 1: Estimates of Albanians living abroad 
Source: Barjaba (2000) and Government of Albania (2005). 
 
The data in table 1 show a clear increase of 350,000 in the number of Albanians living 
abroad between 1999 and 2005. It might be the case that they emigrated during these 
years, but not necessarily. Not knowing how these figures have been calculated makes 
it difficult to draw such conclusions. One thing is for certain: they and the document 
they appeared in – the National Strategy on Migration – indicate an increased 
awareness on the side of the Government of Albania about the issue of emigration. 
Besides an increase in numbers, these figures also indicate a shift in the relative 
importance of various destination countries. Although Greece and Italy remain the 
main receiving countries, other destinations such as the USA, the UK and Canada have 
become attractive to an increasing number of Albanian emigrants. (Vullnetari, 2007: 
35-36). The flows of (current) migrants have fluctuated considerably, more than 
doubling in the aftermath of the collapse of the notorious pyramid scheme in 1997, 
peaking in 2000 at about 50,000 new migrants per year, and steadily decreasing after 
that (Azzarri and Carletto 2009: 4). 
 The potential for migration from Albania remains high due to such push 
factors as unemployment and poverty. Around 30 percent of Albanians are currently 
below the poverty line, and half of them live in extreme poverty, subsisting on less 
than $1 per day. The unemployment rate remains high, despite a recent slow decline. 
In addition, illnesses are a major concern and access to medical care is scarce, 
especially in rural areas. Four out five poor people live in rural areas, and the poverty 
rate among young people is higher than average. Approximately 40 percent of the 
poor live in larger and younger households. These mostly economic hardships have at 
different points combined with episodes of political instability to boost migration 
flows. This was especially true in the period 1997-1998, when labor migration was 
coupled with forced migration (Barjaba 2004).  
adult years of education  11.08 10.12 
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Table 2 gives further evidence on some of the contrasts already noted, and introduces 
new variables into the analysis. Permanent migrants are generally younger, male and 
slightly more educated than the average adult left behind. They are also more likely to 
come from female- and single-headed households.  As expected, migrants come from 
larger households (in 1990) which, largely as a result of migration, are now 
significantly smaller. Similarly, households with migrants are on average less 
educated, partly as a result of the migration of the more educated members in the 
household. Also, migrant households are significantly older, following the migration of 
the younger members in the family. Finally, households with a migrant are also 
wealthier, as illustrated by the different poverty indicators, although clearly the 
causality direction is ambiguous. 
As of education levels of Albanian migrants, the larger numbers of less 
educated individuals are migrating in recent years. Interestingly, female migrants are 
on average more educated than men, particularly in the 1990s; the gap narrows 
somewhat after 2000. The breakdown of the education trends by main destination 
and place of origin of the migrants reveals some interesting differences. The general 
downward trend in educational levels does not concern the flow of permanent 
migrants moving from Tirana and going to destinations beyond Greece and Italy. For 
this particular group of migrants only, educational levels of migrants have remained 
stable over the years, at levels significantly above the rest going to Greece and Italy, 
and originating from other parts of Albania (Azzarri and Carletto 2009: 8-9). 
 
Table 2: Characteristics and education levels of permanent migrants 
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 (c)Evaluation of potential immigration impact on the labor market in the EU:  wages 
and employment levels 
 
According to the theories of migration which we argued above, a major incentive to 
migrate is a real income or wage differentials between regions or countries. It has 
been clearly said that there are very important wage differentials between Albania 
and its neighbor EU countries of Greece and Italy. Average real wages in Albania are 
low and highly attractive to migrate to high real wage levels of EU countries. Also, we 
have to point out that the economic impact of immigration on wages and employment 
levels will obviously differ with the skill level of migrants. If migrants mainly are 
unskilled and native workers mainly skilled, like in the case of emigration from Albania 
to the EU especially Greece and Italy, we can say that native and immigrant workers in 
the production are not substitutes. According to the data which show much of 
Albanian migrants are unskilled, we can easily say that Albania and the EU workers are 
complements. In other words, Albanian immigrant workers and native the EU workers 
have not the same types of skills and are not competing for the same types of jobs 
because of Albanian immigrants workers are mainly unskilled or lower skilled while 
the EU native workers are mainly high or upper skilled.  
 
As we mentioned above, Albanian immigrants and the EU native workers are 
complement in production, an increase in the number of Albanian immigrants raises 
the marginal product of the EU natives, shifting up the demand curve for the EU 
native-born workers. This increase in the EU native productivity raises the EU native 
wages. Moreover, some EU natives who previously did not find it profitable to work 
now see the higher wage rate as an additional incentive to enter the labor market, 
and the EU native employment also rises. On the other hand, the migration of highly 
skilled workers cannot be regarded as an unwanted phenomenon for Europe, while 
Albania could face a significant loss of efficiency or human capital.   
 
In this subject, we can only state that because of Albanian and the EU workers are 
complements, so the impact of immigration on wages and employment condition in 
the EU labor market will be same direction. An increase in the number of immigrants 
raises the marginal product of natives, shifting up the demand curve for native-born 
workers.  This increase in native productivity raises the native wage. On the other 
words, the potential size of migration from Albania to the EU labor market especially 
to Greece and Italy will increase the wages of native workers in the EU and also, some 
natives who previously did not find it profitable to work now see the higher wage rate 
as an additional incentive to enter the labor market, and native employment will rise. 
 
                                                                                                    ICES’09 
 
446 
 
Second International Conference on European Studies
4. Conclusion 
EU state policies that affect Albanian migration are currently mainly inspired by a 
philosophy of stopping, controlling, and reducing migration flows, as opposed to 
favoring and liberalizing channels of legal migration. These policies are feeding a legal 
and institutional asymmetry in the global migration system, since they have resulted 
in an increase in illegal channels and flows of migration. In sending countries such as 
Albania, labor migration is considered an economic and social phenomenon, while in 
receiving countries it is considered a risk to public safety. Due to the EU's increasingly 
restrictionist policies, the flow of regular immigrants from Albania to Italy and Greece 
is currently declining (Barjaba 2004).  
 The effect of migration on wages and employment levels could differ with 
the skill levels of the migrants and labor demand in the EU, especially in receiving 
countries of Greece and Italy. Theoretically, if migrants mainly are unskilled and native 
workers mainly skilled, like in the case of emigration from Albania to the EU Member 
States, we can say easily Albanian and the EU workers are complements. So, an 
increase in the number of Albanian immigrants raises the marginal product of the EU 
natives, shifting up the demand curve for the EU native-born workers. This increase in 
the EU native productivity raises the EU native wages. Moreover, some EU natives 
who previously did not find it profitable to work now see the higher wage rate as an 
additional incentive to enter the labor market, and the EU native employment also 
rises.  
 On the other side, it is very difficult em pi r i c a l l y  to forecast the level as 
well as the structure of this additional migration after accession. The literature on 
this issue does not agree on the size of the potential immigrants from Albania to the 
EU labor market. Although, it is not clear what the sources were or the methods used 
to arrive at these estimates, there is reason to believe that the figures for the main 
countries such as Greece and Italy are very probable. According to the historical 
background size of the Albanian migrants to the especially Greece and Italy the size of 
migration after accession is estimated between 600 thousands and 1.1 million. Such 
migration could contribute to mitigating the possible reduction of the growth 
potential of the EU due to its ageing population. There are perceptions that a 
possible substantial and uncontrolled increase in migration to the EU could lead to 
serious disturbances in the labor markets of some of the present EU States 
especially in Greece and Italy. In  addition  to  the  general  conditions  for  economic  
growth  and  employment,  the  actual migration flows are influenced by pull factors 
such as wage differentials between Albania and the receiving countries but also by 
push factors, such as the labor market situation in Albania itself.    
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 As a result, considering this number of potential migrants, we can easily say 
that the public fears concerning the occupation of the European labor markets 
especially in Greece and Italy by the Albanian immigrants seems to be exaggerated. 
We can clearly state that estimations show the potential number or size of migration 
after possible accession of Albania to the EU. Unfortunately, these estimations do not 
show the impact of this potential size of migrants on the EU labor market like 
especially the effects of immigration on wages and employment opportunities. Up to 
now in literature we do not have any empirical study or result which gives the impact 
of this size of potential migration on wages or employment opportunities of native 
workers in the EU labor market. 
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